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Anne 0.  Krueger 
One of the central tenets of economists for the past two centuries has been the 
proposition  that  free  trade  between  nations  will  in  most  circumstances  be 
highly beneficial, and that any nation which unilaterally adopts a policy of free 
trade will benefit.’ Exceptions to the argument for free trade, such as in cases 
of infant industries and more recently “the new trade theory,”z have been rec- 
ognized, but in most instances, protectionist measures bear little or no relation 
to those exceptions. 
Nonetheless, it has been a source of considerable frustration to most interna- 
tional economists that, in reality, pressure to grant protection to industries often 
arises in circumstances that appear to bear little resemblance to those cases in 
which economic analysis suggests it might be warranted  on the grounds of 
national economic interest. 
Many economists have therefore turned their attention to attempting to un- 
derstand the “political economy” of protection, by which is meant the actual 
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1. The recognized exception to this generalization that is relevant for the United States concerns 
the situation when a country has monopoly power in trade. Even that exception, however, is contin- 
gent on the trading partners being unable to retaliate in ways that are sufficiently harmful. There 
are also arguments that “market failures,” such as externalities, might make the adoption of a free 
trade policy less desirable. Economists’ standard answer to  that, however, has been to note that 
the appropriate policy response to these failures is to correct them at their source-e.g.,  to impose 
a tax or  subsidy to reflect the value of the externality. 
2. The “new” trade theory demonstrates that there may be circumstances under which an inter- 
vention in trade (which might be an export subsidy, an export tax, an import duty, or even an import 
subsidy) could increase the total economic well-being of a country in circumstances in which the 
first entrant(s) to an  industry become established and receive the economic rents that accrue to 
first-comers. The basic rationale is that first entrants can achieve sufficient scale of production so 
that they can simultaneously charge a low enough price to deter other entrants and still have that 
price significantly above their marginal cost of production. 
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determinants  of  which industries  receive protection,  and of  the  structure of 
protection across industries. One line of research has been to develop models 
of the political process by which protection is determined. 
Simultaneously, a number of efforts have been made to estimate empirically 
the determinants of  protection levels (or other trade barriers) for various eco- 
nomic activities. Variables such as the level of employment in the industry, the 
trend in the industry’s employment and profitability, the level of and change in 
the rate of import penetration, and the geographic concentration of the industry 
are then used as possible explanatory factors (see Rodrik 1994, 30ff.). in gen- 
eral, almost every variable appeared to have explanatory power in some cases, 
but no strong systematic pattern has emerged from these analy~es.~ 
A large number of questions remain: the assumptions underlying the models 
of protection determination have not themselves been subject to testing. And, 
while it has been widely recognized that a variety of factors outside these mod- 
els may  influence protection,  little work  has been  undertaken  assessing  the 
relative importance of these factors. 
The NBER project on the political economy of American trade policy was 
designed to try to enrich the understanding of the political economy of trade 
policy by  starting to fill this gap. The intent was to have parallel analytical 
histories of the process of protection seeking and conferring for a number of 
American industries. It was hoped that undertaking parallel in-depth analyses 
of the (economic  and political) determinants  of  protection  and its evolution 
in a number (seven, in the event) of American industries, combined with an 
examination of the determinants of administered protection across industries, 
would increase understanding of the processes by which protection and its lev- 
els are detem~ined.~  The expectation was that these analyses of how protection 
has actually evolved in industries whose circumstances were evidently dissimi- 
lar, supplemented by the “cross-section” study of determinants of administered 
protection, would shed light on the process of protection and its determinants, 
and perhaps yield richer hypotheses for further analysis. 
Questions in the Political Economy of Protection 
A starting point for analyzing the political economy of protection must be 
the basic proposition that, in virtually all circumstances, protection is an eco- 
nomically  inefJicient way  of  achieving  almost any  objective. Regardless  of 
whether the objective is the protection  of workers in a particular industry or 
group of  industries  or the  maintenance  of  productive  capacity  for national 
3. See Krueger (1993) for an examination of the structure of U.S. protection and its failure to 
conform with any of the existing political economy models. 
4. “Administered protection” is the term applied to the use of  the countervailing duty (against 
foreign subsidies) and antidumping (against pricing below cost or below sales price in other mar- 
kets) administrative law by  firms seeking relief from import competition. 3  Introduction 
defense reasons, there are clearly lower-cost ways of  achieving those objec- 
tive  s . 
A satisfactory theory of the political economy of protection must therefore 
address the question as to why these lower-cost means are not chosen. How- 
ever, even prior to that, analysis would need to encompass the determinants of 
(1) the structure of  levels of  protection at any particular time (including not 
only the determinants of why, e.g., apparel is more highly protected than auto- 
mobiles but also why some industries are not at all protected and why there is 
much  more  protection  for  import-competing  industries  than  for exports); 
(2)  the forms in which protection is granted (quantitative restrictions, export 
subsidies, tariffs, voluntary export restraints, etc.); (3) changes in the structure 
of levels and forms of protection over time (which may or may not be the same 
as items 1 and 2 depending on whether “history matters”), and (4) changes in 
the overall levels of protection over time. 
The first item, the structure of levels, refers to the tariff equivalents of vari- 
ous interventions with trade. It can be thought of as a vector, each component 
of which represents the extent to which domestic price of a commodity exceeds 
(or, in the case of an export tax, falls short of) its foreign price (over and above 
transport costs in the relevant direction) by virtue of interventions with trade. 
This is the traditional focus of concern of international economists. 
In recent years, most theoretical work on the political economy of protection 
has addressed this issue (see the recent surveys by  Hillman  1989 and Rodrik 
1994). Models have been developed in which tariffs  are determined by  the 
relative strength of interest groups (see Findlay and Wellisz 1982), by the need 
of politicians to please the general public but also to obtain funds for seeking 
support or reelection (Magee, Brock, and Young  1989; Grossman and Help- 
man  1994), and by the median voter (Mayer 1984). A few models have even 
attempted to address the question as to why (in virtually all countries) interven- 
tions with trade are heavily biased against trade rather than in favor of exports 
(see, e.g., Krueger 1990; Fernandez and Rodrik 1991). 
The second question, the determinants of  the forms of protection, is also 
important for understanding. Why do we observe the United States negotiating 
“voluntary export restraints” with Japan on automobiles, steel, and other prod- 
ucts, rather than itself enforcing import quotas (and thus giving the difference 
between the Japanese price and the U.S. price to Americans, rather than to 
Japanese producers)? Why did the sugar lobby for years oppose the transfor- 
mation of  sugar import quotas into deficiency payments which  would have 
given sugar producers the same price as they received under the quota system? 
5. In the case of employment levels, lower-cost ways include subsidization of employment in 
the industry and adjustment assistance to workers. For national defense purposes, production sub- 
sidies for the stipulated level of productive capacity (and sometimes even stockpiling the good 
in question) can achieve the same objective and simultaneously provide an overall higher level 
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Here, less work has been done, although papers by Hillman ( 1990) and Feens- 
tra and Lewis (1991) have addressed this issue. 
It is quite possible, of course, that the determinants of the structure of protec- 
tive levels are invariant with respect  to time. However, it is also a plausible 
hypothesis  that  there  are laws  of  motion  with  respect  to  protection,  once 
granted, so that, once protection is accorded an industry, it is easier to obtain a 
higher level of protection (for a given situation of the industry) at a later date 
than it would be if there were no preexisting protection. In a sense, protection 
may be like other “entitlements”: something that once received is taken as a 
given and for which only increments matter politically. 
Finally, there are questions  as to  the determinants  of  the overall level of 
protection.  Relatively  more  research  has been  undertaken  on this  question 
(again see Rodrik 1994 for a recent survey). It is widely recognized that U.S. 
trade policy  in the  1950s and  1960s was close in many  dimensions  to free 
trade. By  the  198Os, policy had  shifted further from free trade, and in that 
sense, the vector of protective rates had changed. A number of hypotheses have 
been put forth in the literature: clearly, a higher rate of unemployment leads to 
more pressures for protection across the board (although possibly with differ- 
ential increases in pressures across industries); likewise, real appreciation of 
the dollar leads to more difficulties for tradable industries and as such leads to 
more pressures for protection. 
Questions for the NBER Project 
Especially  for economists, there are many aspects of the political process 
that are not well understood. While, quite clearly, variables such as industry 
profitability  (or lack thereof), unemployment,  and size of industry all matter, 
there are aspects of the political process that matter as well. The NBER project 
on the political economy of American trade protection was designed to explore 
these political phenomena, and their interactions with economic variables. As 
such, questions arise concerning the role of  institutional constraints, lobbies 
and effective organization, determinants of power and influence, and the fac- 
tors influencing politicians’ decisions. 
These are sufficiently unfamiliar ground that it was decided to try to “go to 
the facts” and examine the level, form, and evolution of protection in several 
industries, in the expectation that analytical histories and analysis would throw 
up hypotheses deserving of further exploration in future research. 
It was not hoped that analyses of the evolution of protection for individual 
industries, no matter how well done, would provide definitive evidence in sup- 
port of a particular theory of protection. However, it was expect that the results 
would be highly suggestive of new hypotheses and lines of research that may 
not have emerged from other research approaches. 
In the remainder  of this introduction,  the overall design  of  the project is 
briefly explained, including a description of the industries covered in the proj- 5  Introduction 
ect. Thereafter, the individual studies are presented. Each such study is an im- 
portant contribution in its own right to understanding of the political economy 
of protection and, in addition, provides evidence regarding the more general 
questions raised above. A final chapter then sets forth the systematic patterns 
that appear to emerge, as well as the hypotheses and findings that appear to be 
promising for future research. 
Structure of the Project 
At the outset, the project was conceived as a new approach to the political 
economy questions raised above. A brief outline of the results of previous po- 
litical economy studies, along with the plans for the project, were then sent to 
potential participants in the project. 
On the basis of that paper, an initial meeting of participants was held in the 
spring of 1993, at which the research agenda was discussed and authors spoke 
on their plans for research for their industry. It was clear that each author would 
need to undertake a separate research strategy, depending on the nature of the 
industry  subject to analysis, as well  as on the  state of  existing knowledge. 
Thus, no central “research design” applicable to all studies was planned. Au- 
thors were asked to determine for the activity  they were studying what  the 
most meaningful time period for analysis would be: as can be seen in the indi- 
vidual studies, it varies greatly from one study to another, ranging all the way 
from Orden’s focus on the relatively short period during which the North Amer- 
ican Free Trade Agreement was subject to negotiation  and congressional de- 
bate to Finger and Harrison’s coverage of the evolution of the Multi-Fiber Ar- 
rangement from the 1950s to the 1990s. 
Authors were asked to provide an analytical history of the determinants of 
protection-both  its form and its height-and  then to consider how and why 
protection changed over time. They were asked, among other things, to exam- 
ine who  supported and who opposed protection,  who  gained and who lost. 
Readers will find matrices of  winners and losers mapped against initial sup- 
porters, initial opponents, and those who were inactive. As can be seen in each 
of  the following chapters, what the authors have come up with is rich in in- 
sights as to the phenomena that enter into decisions regarding forms and levels 
of intervention with trade. 
Because focus on the politics of trade-related decisions is relatively new, a 
consensus emerged at the spring 1993 meeting that it would be very useful to 
hold  a session for discussion with people  who had  held key  policy-making 
roles in the trade policy process. People who had recently been or were in key 
roles in the trade community were then invited to come and talk with, and field 
questions from, the  authors regarding the particulars of  protection and  also 
more general issues. A two-day session was then arranged in Washington in 
early July, in which the “witnesses”  spoke informally with participants in the 
project. The people who gave some of their valuable time to the project in that 6  Anne 0.  Krueger 
connection included the Honorable William Brock, former U.S. trade represen- 
tative; Commissioner Anne Brunsdale of the International Trade Commission; 
the Honorable William Frenzel, former congressman and member of the House 
Ways and Means Committee; Michael Moskow, former deputy U.S. trade rep- 
resentative; and Lloyd Olmer, former under secretary of  commerce and inter- 
national trade. 
All of these persons were invited, and some were able also to participate 
in the February  1994 conference described below (and their contributions as 
discussants are reproduced  in  what  follows). All  of  the  individual  industry 
studies, as well as the hypotheses raised in the final chapter, were greatly en- 
riched by  the contribution of these individuals, to whom the  quality of the 
volume owes much. 
Once authors had completed their studies, a conference was held in February 
1993, in which the papers were presented and discussed.6 In light of  those 
discussions, papers were revised and constitute the next eight chapters of this 
volume.’ 
Industries Covered in the Project 
Choice of industries to be included was dictated by several considerations. 
First, it was desirable that there be a variety of industries, with different situa- 
tions. Second, it seemed important to include industries that had sought differ- 
ent forms of protection. Third, it was thought that the mix of industries covered 
should include at least one industry with each of the following characteristics: 
an industry with high political visibility, a relatively obscure industry, at least 
one producer of final goods for the consumer market, and at least one that 
produces producer goods. Fourth, it was essential to locate first-rate research- 
ers knowledgeable about the industries in question who could provide  their 
“human capital” to the project. 
Given the constraints on the total number of studies and these three consid- 
erations, it was finally decided that there should be seven industry studies and 
one  study  of  process  (administered  protection). Among  the  seven industry 
studies, two should focus on various aspects of agricultural protection, and five 
on industrial. Among the industries, it was desirable to include an older indus- 
try long subject to protection (textiles and apparel), a newer high-tech industry 
(semiconductors), industries in which voluntary export restraints (VERs) had 
6. At that conference, there was a panel discussion among those of the policymakers who were 
able to attend, which was also invaluable. Although an effort was made to record that discussion 
in a format appropriate for reproduction in this volume, it was, regrettably, unsuccessful. For most 
authors, it was one of the highlights of the conference. 
7. After the chapters included in  this volume were completed, the authors prepared  shorter 
versions, which were presented at a conference held in Washington in September 1994. in order 
to provide the policymakers and analysts there with an overview of the project results. 7  Introduction 
been negotiated (automobiles and steel), and a small industry (lumber). A brief 
overview of each of  these industries may help the reader in approaching the 
individual studies. A final study was sought to analyze how one mechanism for 
protection-administered  protection through antidumping and countervailing 
duties-actually  operates. Since this protection is provided under a quasi-legal 
process, it appeared important to examine the extent to which even these pro- 
cesses are influenced by political and economic factors. 
Steel and automobiles, by contrast, are industries in which U.S. firms held 
dominant positions worldwide until at least the early  1970s. Since that time, 
both industries have lost their preeminent positions, imports have increased, 
and both have sought protection. Both are highly visible industries but neither 
is “labor intensive,” and both are reasonably geographically concentrated. Pro- 
tection  for automobiles came in the form of  “voluntary export restraints”  on 
imports from Japan for a period of time in the early and mid- 1980s-there  had 
been pressures earlier, and yet it was not until then that VERs were adopted, 
and they were later abandoned. Douglas Nelson traces the protection for auto- 
mobiles under the VER agreed to by Japan in the early 1980s until the aban- 
donment of  VERs several years later. In the case of automobiles, it was appar- 
ently the fear that congressional action would result in even more restrictive 
and protective arrangements for automobiles that led the U.S. administration 
to accept a VER arrangement. 
Michael Moore undertook the steel study. Protection for steel under VERs 
and other administrative  arrangements was accorded for much of  the  1970s 
and 1980s after the industry filed a large number of complaints alleging unfair 
trade practices on the part of foreign producers. These pending cases were then 
used as a bargaining instrument in negotiating export restraints  with foreign 
governments. By the end of the  1980s, however, the steel industry’s ability to 
achieve protection through this means was greatly diminished. 
The semiconductor industry, by contrast, is much smaller and is also a “new” 
industry. It is certainly not labor intensive, and it is reasonably geographically 
concentrated. In his study, Douglas Irwin traces the initial development of the 
industry in the 1960s and 1970s. American firms were world leaders and ini- 
tially dominated the industry, but by the late 1970s, the preeminence of these 
firms was being challenged by successful Japanese entry into the market. Start- 
ing  in  the  early  1980s,  the  industry  sought  protection,  which  it  finally 
achieved-at  least in part-in  the  Semiconductor Agreement of  1986, and 
subsequent agreements, negotiated with Japan. The political economy of that 
agreement is interesting in many regards, not the least of which is Irwin’s ac- 
count of the extent to which the industry’s goals (and, at one point, the goals 
of a single firm) became the U.S. government’s negotiating position. The semi- 
conductor industry is also interesting because of the important third-country 
effects that impaired the ability of the United States to deal bilaterally  on a 
trade issue. Not only did the Europeans protest the U.S.-negotiated  deal under 8  Anne 0.  Krueger 
which Japanese firms were not to export below prices  set in the agreement, 
but the higher prices which followed the agreement were clearly  a factor in 
supporting Korean entry into the semiconductor industry. 
Interestingly, these three industries were protected through bilateral arrange- 
ments made between  U.S. and foreign governments.  As can be  seen in the 
individual studies, the U.S. administration (and the foreign government) was 
frequently reluctant  to enter into such protective  arrangements but did so in 
the belief  that failure to undertake these measures would  spur administered 
protection or congressional action that might be even more protective of the in- 
dustry. 
Textiles and apparel represent an industry whose fortunes have been declin- 
ing since the early part of  the twentieth  century, and in which pressures  for 
protection have been intense since the mid- 1950s. Many parts of the industry 
are relatively labor intensive, and it is geographically widespread, although its 
political power is based in the South. Protection began in the mid-l950s, when 
the United States negotiated a Short Term Arrangement covering cotton prod- 
ucts with Japan (on the rationale that because of agricultural policies in the 
United States, Japanese producers could obtain needed cotton from the United 
States more cheaply than could U.S. producers), but then went to longer-term 
agreements at first covering cotton products only and then extending to other 
products and other countries. European countries also began protecting their 
textiles and apparel, and finally, in an effort to bring some discipline to bear 
on these bilateral quantitative restrictions, protection has been granted the in- 
dustry under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), an increasingly complex set 
of quantitative restrictions on imports negotiated by individual product cate- 
gory under an umbrella arrangement concluded under the auspices of the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.8 Michael Finger and Ann Harrison ex- 
plore the ways in which the industry sought, and received, protection and how 
it became modified over time. In the case of the MFA, Finger and Harrison 
report  estimates that protection  for textiles  and apparel accounted for more 
than 80 percent of the entire economic cost of U.S. protection as of  the late 
1980s. 
The U.S. lumber industry represents yet another situation. As Joseph Kalt 
points out, the industry is relatively small and geographically concentrated. It 
certainly does not have the visibility of textiles and apparel, automobiles, steel, 
or even semiconductors. Nonetheless, since the early  1980s, the U.S. lumber 
industry has also sought protection against Canadian imports through the ad- 
ministered  protection process. In the eyes of  many U.S. trading partners and 
economists,  administered  protection  under US. trade  laws has become the 
“protectionist weapon of choice.” As such, inclusion of an industry whose pri- 
mary  approach to the protection process was through the use of  “fair trade 
laws” seemed highly desirable in the project. 
8. Under the Uruguay Round agreement, the MFA is to be phased out over a 12-year period. 9  Introduction 
There are two industry studies which focus on agriculture, where the mecha- 
nisms  and instruments used for protection  are quite different than those for 
American industry. Bruce Gardner’s study focuses on wheat,  and  the emer- 
gence of the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) under which wheat farmers 
pressured for subsidies to be given for U.S. exports of wheat. Wheat has long 
been a major grain crop in the midwestern part of the United States, is grown 
by  relatively numerous producers, and is a crop in which the United States is 
generally believed to have considerable comparative advantage. Facing declin- 
ing exports due to appreciation of the dollar, European subsidies, and unsus- 
tainable domestic price supports, an EEP was implemented for wheat, under 
which American wheat farmers in effect received “protection” for their exports 
during the 1980s. It was started when farm incomes had been badly  hit by a 
combination of  factors including the disinflation of  the early  1980s and the 
real appreciation of the U.S. dollar. Once in place, EEP was extended despite 
the disappearance of the initial circumstances which had resulted in the pres- 
sure for its enactment. 
The other agricultural study, by  David Orden, examines the roles and for- 
tunes of various agricultural groups in the negotiations leading up to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Agriculture comprises many di- 
verse sectors: some sectors-such  as wheat-are  exporters and will benefit 
from reduced protection at home and abroad; other sectors-such  as sugar- 
are  protected  from import  competition.  In  the  negotiations,  these  interests 
competed within the broader framework of other aspects of the NAFTA. Some 
agricultural export producers were considerably more effective than others at 
gaining access to the Mexican market. Likewise, the effectiveness of import- 
competing sectors at delaying or reducing the rate at which trade with Mexico 
would be freed from restraints varied. Orden’s analysis of who was influential, 
and why, sheds further light on the determinants of protection. 
The final study focuses on administered protection  seen from a different 
perspective. Critics of  U.S.  administered protection have suggested that the 
process not only provides protection in cases where dumping or subsidies do 
occur but even gives U.S. producers protection in that the processes are biased 
against foreign importers and the threat of being hit with an antidumping or 
subsidies suit is itself a deterrent to foreign importers. Staiger and Wolak study 
this phenomenon, with findings that are important in their own right and simul- 
taneously provide insight from yet another angle into the understanding of the 
overall political economy of protection. As can be seen from their results, de- 
spite the legal constraints on the process of protection, it would appear that 
factors  other  than  the  criteria  laid  down  by  law  influence  the  outcome  of 
these deliberations. 
Each of these studies alone is of interest. But, together, they also shed addi- 
tional light on the political economy of U.S. trade policies. The final chapter 
therefore summarizes some of the important findings and questions that arise 
from analysis of the individual studies. LO  Anne 0.  Krueger 
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